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PRESENTATION

NOTES & HAND–OUT

Jurisdiction and Responsibility:
Community and the Force of Law Between Khadr and Amnesty
Craig Scott ∗

The following are presentation notes that were handed out to participants at the 2008
Constitutional Cases conference:
It is useful to begin with a quotation that situates the current Charter territorial application discussion
within the understanding of the Canadian criminal law jurisdiction set out in the 1985 landmark Libman
case by La Forest J. for the Court:
67. This country has a legitimate interest in prosecuting persons for activities that take place
abroad but have an unlawful consequence here, (as in Peters, for example). Indeed, from an
early period the English courts have recognized such an interest in other countries.. The
protection of the public in this country is widely acknowledged to be a legitimate purpose of
criminal law, and one moreover that another nation could not easily say offended the
dictates of comity.
68. But the courts did not confine themselves to taking jurisdiction over transnational
offences whose impact was felt within the country. As early as 1883…they also took
jurisdiction in cases where the victim and hence the impact was abroad. In the early cases,
there was a tendency to justify this in terms of the links that connected the act to the
jurisdiction. In doing so they foreshadowed modern academic writing on the subject, which
points out that a similar approach prevails in both public and private international law…
71. ….For in considering that question we must, in my view, take into account all relevant
facts that take place in Canada that may legitimately give this country an interest in
prosecuting the offence. One must then consider whether there is anything in those facts
that offends international comity.
72. …. Apart from this, though the criminal law is undoubtedly intended for the protection
of the public, it does not do so solely by the simple expedient of directly protecting the
public from harm. Rather, in conformity with its major purpose, it attempts to underline the
fundamental values of our society.. It would be a sad commentary on our law if it was
limited to underlining society's values by the prosecution of minor offenders while
permitting more seasoned practitioners to operate on a world-wide scale from a Canadian
base by the simple manipulation of a technicality of the law's own making. What would be
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underlined in the public's mind by allowing criminals to go free simply because their
operations have grown to international proportions, I shall not attempt to expound.
74. …..As it is put by modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a "real and substantial
link" between an offence and this country, a test well-known in public and private
international law…
76. Just what may constitute a real and substantial link in a particular case, I need not
explore. There were ample links here. The outer limits of the test may, however, well be
coterminous with the requirements of international comity.
77. …Since [the late 19th century] means of communications have proliferated at an
accelerating pace and the common interests of states have grown proportionately. Under
these circumstances, the notion of comity, which means no more nor less than "kindly and
considerate behaviour towards others", has also evolved. How considerate is it of the
interests of the United States in this case to permit criminals based in this country to prey on
its citizens? How does it conform to its interests or to ours for us to permit such activities
when law enforcement agencies in both countries have developed cooperative schemes to
prevent and prosecute those engaged in such activities? To ask these questions is to answer
them. …I also agree with the sentiments expressed by Lord Salmon in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Doot, supra, that we should not be indifferent to the protection of the public in
other countries. In a shrinking world, we are all our brother's keepers. In the criminal arena
this is underlined by the international
cooperative schemes that have been developed among national law enforcement bodies.
78. ….I see nothing in the requirements of international comity that would dictate that this
country refrain from exercising its jurisdiction.

The protective function of the Charter in relation at the very least to the conduct of Canadian government
actors abroad is directly analogous, from a first-principles and systemic-values perspective, to the
philosophy of the SCC expressed almost 25 years ago with respect to the protective function of the
criminal law in relation to harms caused to non-Canadians suffering Canadian-related harm outside
Canada.
****

Khadr, 2008, SCC (unanimous) – CSIS interviews/interrogation as participation in US

Guantánamo process when they handed over the results to US authorities: CHARTER APPLIES
+ BREACH OF CHARTER
• Preliminary: interpretation of Khadr inextricably tied to Amnesty case decided subsequently by
FCA, but I will first comment briefly on Khadr (and on its understanding of Hape) before moving
to the interpretations/applications by the FCA in Amnesty of the Khadr case
• Hape’s overruling of Cook’s “error” in interpreting s.32(1) of Charter to apply to conduct of
Canadian government personnel abroad because Parliamentary “authority” is a prior question;
because the law pertaining to police investigation is assimilated to being nothing but enforcement
jurisdiction (versus prescriptive and/or adjudicative jurisdiction), and because PIL is found to
allow for enforcement only by the territorial state (unless that state consents to another state’s
enforcement activities), then ipso facto the Charter cannot apply because (interpreted in light of this
understanding of PIL jurisdictional principles) Parliament does not have the power to “enforce”
its laws in another state
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• In Hape, the SCC majority misunderstands the line between enforcement jurisdiction and
prescriptive as well as related adjudicative jurisdiction.
• However, in Khadr, the Hape understanding of the territorial scope of application of the Charter in
relation to some sort of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) exception leads to the basic
finding in Khadr that the Charter both applies and has been breached; disclosure of documents is
ordered.
• Note the role in Khadr of USSC judgments on illegalities in Guantánamo process in relation to
IHRL findings.
• Relationship between violation of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and (a) applicability
of Charter and/versus (b) limitation on comity rationale for not applying otherwise-applicable
Canadian law
• Charter application to evidence produced through rights violations: so far, at SCC level, this is the
only context, but the Hape and Khadr IHRL reasoning not so limited > on to the FCA in Amnesty.

Amnesty International and BCCLA v. Chief of Defence Staff et al, FCA, 2008 (unanimous) –

transfer of prisoners by Canadian military to Afghan authorities with risk of torture or other
abuse after handover: CHARTER DOES NOT APPLY (THUS, NO BREACH OF CHARTER)
• Two questions: 1. Does Charter apply? 2. If not, does it nevertheless apply because of a claimed
Hape IHRL exception? Unhelpfully, the FCA deals with the questions in reverse order.
• Interpretation of Charter applicability based on Hape > The FCA appears to reject Hape reasoning
of Charter applicability as being able to arise despite initial non-applicability of the Charter; the
FCA appears to view consent to application of foreign law (i.e. consent by Afghanistan to
application of Charter of Rights to Canadian military conduct) as the only exception to Charter
non-applicability abroad.
• Even then, the FCA gets Afghanistan “consent” badly wrong on the facts by assuming
application of Canadian law to Canadian personnel does not cover the case at hand
• Also, the FCA simply misreads Khadr when FCA says Hape + Khadr does not result in application
of Charter in the event of the IHRL exception being triggered.
• Implicitly, the FCA sees the existence of the USSC cases as dispositive to SCC reasoning in Khadr
versus seeing the USSC case as simply the SCC’s convenient proxy for proof and establishment of
IHRL violations.
• The FCA invokes the Bankovic/ECHR interpretion on effective control over the person almost as
if some sort of direct precedent for Canada and (a) as if International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) does not exist (e.g. 1981 De Casariego v Uruguay and Lopez Burgos v
Uruguay, two longstanding UN Human Rights Committee cases; 2004 General Comment on
ICCPR 2(1)) and (b) as if that case has not been widely criticized as tortured reasoning and veiled
political deference by the ECtHR.
• It is ironic how the FCA continually asserts how Canada and Afghanistan agreed that
international law was the common denominator in terms of being the law applicable to conduct
by their officials (soldiers, police, etcetera) but fails to grasp why this should only reinforce the
argument that Canadian courts applying IHRL (including overlapping International Humanitarian
Law – IHL – or International Criminal Law – ICL) is not an affront to traditional comity in
Canada-Afghanistan relations. At the very least, from even a traditional comity-shaped
sensitivity (however misguided the traditional understanding may be), the FCA could have viewed
these legal facts on the Canada-Afghanistan relationship in a way similar to how the SCC
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referenced USSC decisions in Khadr as the factor that made it easier for SCC to apply the Hape
IHRL exception.
• There is a complete lack of interpretive recourse by the FCA to Public International Law
principles of attribution and state responsibility in relation to other states’ acts in the law of state
responsibility (2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility > General Assembly of the UN) or to
parallel legal developments on the law related to aiding and abetting in ICL.
• One close-to-the-surface subtext in the FCA judgment is a citizens (Khadr) versus foreigners
(Amnesty) dichotomy; returning to the SCC Libman case and its ethos, this FCA discourse gets the
legal and moral community all wrong.
• Is territoriality of the disclosure order in Khadr relevant, sub-textually or in relation to
understanding the case’s force for the future?
Back to Hape, 2007 (Lebel J. for a majority of 5) – RCMP investigation in Turks & Caicos and
issue of lack of warrants according to Canadian Charter standards: NO APPLICATION OF
CHARTER (THUS, NO BREACH OF CHARTER) + NO SEPARATE BREACH OF
CHARTER IN TRIAL PROCESS
• Note again that the FCA in Amnesty was clearly wrong at the basic level as to what the SCC said
in Hape, and then in Khadr.
• At same time, the FCA implicitly picks up on (a) the analytical incoherence of Hape on Charter
applicability being triggered only if IHRL violations occur in Hape-like police investigation
circumstances and (b) the SCC’s (Lebel J.’s) misunderstanding of these kind of investigation cases
as all and only about enforcement jurisdiction versus prescriptive jurisdiction (the latter dealing
with the scope of application of Canadian law for purposes of consequences in Canadian legal
system).
• There needs to be a return to the sophistication of Cook on the jurisdiction and power of a state
to apply its own laws to generate legal effects in its own legal system subject to an analysis of
whether this represents an undue intrusion in a foreign legal system. There needs as well to be a
return to the ethos and big picture understandings of moral responsibility found in the LaForest J.
judgment (for the Court) in Libman.
• Note in Hape LeBel J.’s own admonition to Binnie J. about letting law evolve as the Court learns
and is faced with new situations. This collegial lecture should probably apply to Hape itself,
although there is the ever-present danger that a new SCC configuration could use the analytical
incoherence of Hape as a reason to back off of the IHRL reference point entirely.
• A final observation with respect to the line of jurisprudence on extraterritoriality and the Charter
from Terry, Harrer, and Cook through to Hape, Khadr and Amnesty: the federal Department of
Justice can be viewed as a repeat player in the same way we think of insurance companies and
other powerful litigants as repeat players. The repeat player advantage is especially reinforced
when intervenor status is denied by the FCA to the U of T Faculty of Law’s IHRL Clinic based
on it being characterized by the FCA motions judge as essentially a law firm with ‘only’ a
“jurisprudential” interest in conformity of Canadian law with IHRL.
• The repeat player advantage is arguably also reinforced by the ongoing poverty of legal education
in Canada and corresponding professional and judicial understanding of foundational principles,
processes, sources, and institutions of public international law (not to mention the related
structure and principles of private international law / conflict of laws).
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